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1.

SUMMARY:

Four District Courts -- three 3-Judge

Courts and one 1-Judge Court -- have declared unconstitutional those parts of the Social Security Act which condition
II

1'\

husband and widower's benefits on a showing of dependency,
in light of the fact that no such showing is required for
wives and widows.

The SG has filed four appeals

under

28 U.S.C. § 1252 -- from these decisions seeking to reverse
them on the merits.

He concedes that in all but one of the

cases the appellee had achieved a sufficiently final rejection
of his claim from the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare
that the District Courts properly had jurisdiction over the
cases.

The husband and widower in two of the cases has filed

a cross-appeal attacking the refusal of the court below to
issue what they refer to as an "injunction."
2.

FACTS:

Payment of social security benefits to a

husband, on account of the wages earned by his retired wife,
is conditioned, inter alia, on a demonstration that the husband
was receiving at least one-half of his support from his wife at
the time of retiremento
security

benefit~

42 U.S.Co § 402(c).

Payment of

socia~

to a widower, on account of the wages earned

.by his wife, is conditioned, inter alia, on a demonstration that
the widower was receiving at least one-half of his support from
his wife at the time of her death.

Payment of such benefits to

wives of retired husbands and to widows is not so conditioned.
Dependency is conclusively presumed.

- 3 -

Appellees Goldfarb and Coffin were denied widower's
benefits under the dependency requirement; and appellees
Silbowitz, Jablon and Coffin were denied husband's benefits
under the same requirement.

All but Coffin concededly had

their claims for benefits finally denied by the Secretary of
HEW.

The SG claims Coffin did not.

However, the SG does not

wish the issue to be decided.

If one of the other cases is
vers
reversed, the SG says the Coffin case can be reill!l·ed without
reaching the jurisdictional issue.
af~irm~d,

If the other appeals are

the SG will withdraw the . appeal in Coffin .
." ' .

The courts below all declared 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) and
(f) unconstitutional on the authority of Fronterio v. Richardson ,
411 U.S. 677, and Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, reversing the Secretary's refusal to pay benefits to the appellees.
1

The courts in Coffin and Jablon refused to grant ' injunctions''
a~ainst

•

the Secretary's application of the statute .
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG says that the decisions below

will cost the Social Security trust fund $400 million a year in
benefits which Congress never intended to pay.

Dependency is

the principle upon which widows, widowers, husbands and wives'
benefits are to be paid under the Act.

Seven out of eight wive s

are dependent on their husbands within the Act's definition of
dependency, and only one out of eight husbands is dependent on
his wife.

It is thus reasonable for the Congress to conclude

that it is cheaper to pay all wives than to go through the ad~~
ministrative expense of separatin~;\· the one out of eight which
Congress did not really want to pay o

- 4 This conclusion

is powerfully fortified by the

fact that another condition of receipt of widows or wives'
benefits is that the widow or wife must not be receiving
social security benefits of her own in an amount larger than

.-1

Oll._Ci l-' 0 u. •

those received by her

husb-an~(:

D:;

h; S

~ IA.H ·)

W ,;,

~~! )

~

In almost every <!ase of a non-

dependent wife or widow, she will be unable to meet this other
criterion.

The SG acknowledges, of course, that the same

principle weeds out most non-dependent husbands and widowers.
~~;II

However, there isA~considerable number of men who earn more
than their wives, but who do so in jobs which do not contribute
to social security and who therefore do not receive larger
social security payments than their wives.
(

It is this class of

people who will receive the $400 million of which the SG complains o
The SG seems to recognize that this case is at first
blush squarely governed by Fronterio v. Richardson, supra.

He

argues, however, that the determinative factor in Fronterio \va s
that the dependency presumption there had the effect of giving
men greater compensation for equal work.
not the purpose of the payments.

Here compensation is

Insurance for dependent per-

sons whose provider has ceased to provide is.

The SG points t o

no language in Fronterio which supports his interpretation of
it and I have found none.

The SG's argument really seems to be

that after Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, in which this
(

Court applied a rational basis test to a social security act
classification, Fronterio is to be limited to its facts.

- 5 -

Appellees disagree.
In their cross-appeal, the husbands -- or more
accurately their lawyers who are the same in each case
complain that no "injunction" was issued.
however, what they really mean.

That is not,

They are aware that the orders

below require the Secretary to pay money to their clients and

I

that he will do so even if not subject to contempt for failure
to do so.

What they want is an injunction ordering the

Secretary to pay people other than their clients but who are
similarly situated.
4.

DISCUSSION:

ertified.)
I thought that the reason for the

Fronterio decision was that the classification was on the basis
of sex.

However, this is the express reasoning of only four

members of the Court.

The brief remarks of a fifth member of

the Court make it difficult to determine whether the fact that
the classification was sex-based entered into his decision.

If

the fact that the classification in Fronterio was gender-based
was important to the decision, Salfi would not be particularly
relevant.

Otherwise, it might be.

Perhaps I then I one of the

appeals should be noted to resolve the uncertainty.
The cross-appeals seem frivolous to me. Courts do not
----·1;,
to pay money~or
fashion other relief running ~
order defendants
1\

to ) people who are not parties to a law suit.

The class action

device was invented to avoid the multiplicity of suits which
might result from this proposition.

bel~~yway,

No classes were certified

the Secretary will be morally bound by any

~

- 6 -

decision of this Court in these cases, summary or otherwise.
There are two cross-appeals and four motions to
affirm.
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No. 75-699, Mathews v. Goldfarb

This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look
at the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study
of the case prior to argument and decision.

When an opinion is

expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative.

* * * *
This is one of several appeals from decisions invalidating
the provisions of Section 402 of the Social Security Act that impose a condition that a widower is entitled to benefits from his
deceased wife's Social Security only if he

~hows

that he was

receiving at least one half of his support from the wife when she
died.

No such showing is required by a widow.
Appellee's brief states, correctly I believe, that five

appeals by the Solicitor General challenge this holding.
list of the cases, see appellee's brief, p. 3.)

(For a

This case, Goldfarb,

No. 75-699

2.

was the first case docketed.

It is here from a three-judge court

in New York, where in a conclusory and brief per curiam opinion,
the court said:
It is conceded that had the gender of these
spouses been reversed, the plaintiff would
have been granted Social Security benefits.
A female need not show "at least one-half
support from" the deceased spouse. • • •
Thus, the statute and its application to
[Goldfarb], "deprive women of protection
for their families that men receive as a
result of their employment."
The three-judge court stated that the "case is controlled by
Wiesenfeld."
Circuit Judge Moore , concurred because he considered
Frontiero (411
controlling.

u.s.

677) and Wiesenfeld (420 U.S. 636) to be

Judge Moore indicated his disagreement with these

decisions:
The Congress presumably, after giving the
problem due consideration and weighing the
pertinent facts, enacted the legislation
in question.
If there are to be presumptions
it would be but fair to the legislative branch
to presume that their enactments were designed
to be rationally related to the goal which
they desired to achieve. By this decision it
seems to me that the court is creating a new
class of beneficiaries which Congress did
not create.

The SG ! s Position
Congress first enacted a program of survivors' benefits
in 1939, including only aged widows.

Not until 1950 did it bring

No. 75-699

3.

aged widowers under the Act.

Different standards of eligibility

were prescribed for the two classes of beneficiaries.

The SG

argues that:
Those differences arose from the fact that
a very substantial proportion of aged widows
found themselves in dire need upon the death
of their spouse, while aged widowers were
better situated because they had generally
been self-supporting over most of their working
lives.
It was therefore rational for Congress
in 1939 to provide aged widows with benefits
without their having to prove that their husbands had supported them. Such a requirement
would have been an unnecessary burden on the
vast majority of such widows, who would qualify
in any event; and it would have gratuitously
increased the administrative complexity of
the widows' benefit program.
In contrast, since the vast majority of
widowers were not dependent on their spouses,
it was rational for Congress to conclude in
1950 that the probable needs of this class
warranted extension of survivors' benefits to
widowers only when they had been dependent on
their wives for a substantial part of their
support.
The SG's brief is replete with statistics said to support
the rationality of classifying widowers differently from widows.
See SG's brief, pp. 26, 27, 34.
As would be expected, the SG relies primarily on cases
in which the Court has repeatedly applied the rational basis test
(some would say the minimum rational basis test) to economic and
social legislation.

These cases include the familiar ones of

Richardson v. Belcher, 404

u.s.

78, 81; Dandridge v. Williams,

4.

No. 75-699

397

u.s.

at 487i and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495.

In

response to appellee's position that this gender-based classification is invalid under Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, the SG relies
on Kuhn v. Shevin, 416

u.s.

u.s.

351, and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419

498.

Position of Appellee
In an elaborate and spphisticated brief for appellee
(Ginsberg, Wolff and Peratis for the ACLU), the emphasis --as
expected -- is on the alleged sex discrimination.

Female wage-

earners are denied Social Security benefits (for their spouse)
accorded the spouse of male wage-earners.

Viewed in this light,

Wiesenfeld does seem to be controlling.

Comments
As is evident, I am undertaking only the briefest
identification of the issue and positions of the parties.

Nor

am I undertaking at this time any analysis of the competing
authorities.

I have the issue well in mind, and think it must be

resolved by a careful application of the cases mentioned above.
At the time we noted this case, I thought it rather clear
that this gender-based classification was invalid under Wiesenfeld
and Frontiero.

Having now scanned the briefs, and reflected further

on the issue, I am no longer confident that my initial view is correct.

No. 75-699

5.

There is a good deal to Judge Moore's view.

Neither party relies

specifically on any designated portion of the legislative history,
and yet is clear that Congress deliberately classified widowers
differently from widows.

It is also clear, as indicated by the

statistics in the SG's brief, that this difference in classification
was not a frivolous one.
future,

Whatever may be the situation in the

in 1950 -- and even now

the economic facts support

the Congressional judgment that the need of widows is of a different character and magnitude from the need of widowers.

Thus,

if the classification is viewed in terms of the purpose of the
Social Security Act (to provide for the needy aged), the classification is rational.

If, however, it is viewed from that of a

working wife who pays the same Social Security taxes as the husband,
the classification is certainly gender-based, and -- under our
~

cases -- has a degree of "suspectness" not present in other equal
protection analysis.
I would like for my clerk to present both sides of this
issue as strongly as possible in light of our prior decisions.

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Tyler Baker

DATE:

August 12, 1976

No. 75-699 Matthews v. Goldfarb
1

This case

arose from the denial by the Social Security

Administration of appellee's application for monthly social
security survivors' benefits (widower's insurance) on the
earnings record of his deceased wife, Hannah Goldfarb.

Mrs.

Goldfarb had contributed to social security pursuant to the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act for a period of 25 years
and was a fully insured person under the system.

The Social

Security Administration denied appellee's application for the
following reason:
You do not qualify for a widower's benefit because
you do not meet one of the [statutory] requirements
for such entitlement. This requirement is that you
must have been receiving at least one half support
from your wife when she died.
The dependency requirement relied on by the Social Security
Administration is mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 402(f )(l)(D).

There

is no such dependency requirement for the payment of the
survivor's benefits (widow's insurance) to the spouse of a
·~

male insured individual.

42 U.S.C. § 402(e).

-----------

Had appellee not been required to show dependency, as
defined above, he would have been entitled to benefits.

There

are several other requirements, including age and absence
of remarriage.

One of these additional requirements needs to

2.
be emphasized for purposes of the discussion that follows.
The appellee was required to show that he was not personally
entitled to old-age insurance benefits equal to or in excess
2

of his deceased wife's primary insurance amount.
402(f)(l)(E).

42 U.S.C.

This requirement must also be met by widows

l

applying for benefits under their deceased husbands' account.
Appellee was able to meet this requirement, not because he was
entitled to lower primary benefits than his wife, but rather

~
~

because he was entitled to no benefits at all.

Appellee had

been employed as a federal employee and, therefore, had not been

underl:h: :::~a:h:::u::::i::~t::ea:h:::~judge DC held that the
~ unconstitutionality of the challenged statute was established
by this Court's decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975).

The DC noted that Mrs. Goldfarb had paid taxes

at the same rate as men and that "there is not the slightest
scintilla of support for the propos i tion that working women
are less concerned about their spouses' welfare in old age than
are men."
DC found

J.S. at 3a.

Working from those propositions, the

the following language from Wiesenfeld to be conclusive:

[S]he not only failed to receive for her family
the same protection which a similarly situated
male worker would have received, but she also
was deprived of a portion of her own earnings
in order to contribute to the fund out of which
benefits would be paid to others. Since the
Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation premised upon ~ssum~tiogs as to dependency
made in the statutes before us in Frontiero,
the Constitution also forbids the gender-based

3.
differentiation that results in the efforts of
women workers required to pay social security
taxes producing less protection for their families
than is produced by the efforts of men. 420 U.S.,
at 645.
It is impossible to determine from the DC's opinion whether
the Government made any attempt to introduce any empirical
evidence in support of the statutory differentiation.

Certainly,

there are no findings of fact of the type made in Craig v. Boren.
explanation may be that the DC assumed that no such
empirical demonstration would affect the legal conclusion.
.
1 '\d ec~s~ons
. .
. t h e ~nstant
.
Th ere are two ,,p~vota
to b e rna d e ~n
case.

Tht!?irst is the determination of the Congressional

purpose in enacting the challenged statute.
.............

The analysis here

~

could provide an opportunity to give Prof. Gunther's intermediate
equal protection theory a mild boost.

Assuming that my view

of the congressional purpose is correct,

th~estion

then

becomes whether administrative convenience and savings can
ever be a sufficient ground for a gender-based discrimination,
for that is the only justification for the differentiation here.
I certainly would not want to make administrative convenience
an automatic justification in these cases, but I do think that
th~ term mal

-

s omej tim;: mask a much harder problem:

giving up

a good program, or extending it to areas where there is not
a perceived need, or wasting large amounts of scarce resources
in inefficient paper shuffling.

Both of the above questions

are posed in an interesting context.

If my reading of

congressional purpose is correct, the claim for equal treatment
here is for treatment that is fundamentally inconsistent with

I

-----

the underlying theory of the statute.

--

4.
Congressional Purpose:

An interesting shift in argument occurs between the SG's
Jurisdictional Statement and his Brief.

Of the two, the

r

following argument from the Jurisdictional Statement is by far
the more straightforward and, in my view, candid.

~

Y/!:i
vi~ ~
fohrmererslyocial
~o
'
..

VV

The argument

benefits, as with
security provisions, is to replace the support

provided by the insured person and lost as a result

of his/her death.

~
~

The proof of that support is dependency as

defined by the statute.

In the Jurisdictional Statement, the

SG argues simply that, "This legislative classification
reasonably implements t 9q

object ~e

of Congress to confer

Social Security benefits upon spouses who were dependent upon
the primary wage earner."

JS at 7.

The argument continues

that it is a demonstrable fact that many more women are dependent
on men than vice versa.

The SG then cites Salfi

as support for

the proposition that administrative convenience justifies using
a presumption of dependency for widows but not for widowers.
The SG recognized that the challenged statute "may result in
the payment of benefits to some women whose earnings were not
covered by the Social Security Act and who were in fact self~

~~ supporting."

J.S. at 11 n. 10.

Despite that acknowledgment,

" ~4J~

the SG argues that when tested by the standards established

'~

in Salfi, the statute is constitutional.
the SG seems to have lost his nerve; he
The argument sketched above is

/

5.
not entirely abandoned, but it is now embellished with another,
quite different argument.

Unfortunately, the strands of the

arguments become tangled.

The new argument is an attempt to

justify the statute under the Court's existing sex discrimination doctrine, with primary reliance being placed on the Court's
decision in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).

Rather than

N

relying on labor statistics to support the presumption of

---------:-,,--

---~------------------------------------

dependency, as in the Jurisdictional Statement, the SG now relies
on those statistics to emphasize the desperate economic plight
--~

1

--

of widows.

Because of the need of widows as a group, the SG

now argues that Congress intended to give them benefits under
this statute even when they would not otherwise qualify under
the standards applied to widowers.

Under this theory, the

payment to widows who would not have been eligible had they
been men is not regretted over-inclusiveness resulting from
administrative necessity, but the intentional act of a Congress
recognizing the problems of widows as a class.

If the SG's

analysis were accepted, the case would be similar to Kahn in
Court upheld a state law giving a property tax
exemption to all widows regardless of need.
is, however,

The instant case

-

because of the asserted discrimina.,
tion against women workers who have paid social security
distinguish~le

contributions.

Kahn did not involve this problem of equal

payments, but unequal benefits, because the property tax break
was financed, in effect, by all property taxpayers.

Also Kahn

involved the area of state taxation, an area in which the Court
has consistently given the states wide berth.

6.
Apart from the fact that the SG discovered the congressional purpose to help widows after submitting his Jurisdictional
Statement, I don't find it very convincing.

The decision to

include a group such as widows or children of insured workers
was undoubtedly made on the basis of the perceived need of the
group.

Perceived need was certainly one of the motivating

factors leading to the adoption of the social security system.

I

The question remains, however, why Congress did not include

a dependency showing for widows as well as widowers.

The fact

that the group of widows was included does not necessarily

indicate a congressional intent that every member of the group
recover benefits.

Indeed, the requirement applicable to both

widows and widowers, that the claimant have primary benefits
of their own less than those of the other person belies any
congressional intention to benefit all widows in a way
comparable to the property tax exemption in Kahn.

Since that

requirement was imposed on widows, the SG must argue that
Congress concluded that the impoverished state of widows
justified exemption from one requirement - dependency - but
not exemption from another - level of primary benefits.

In

fact, as appellee's case indicates, it seems more likely that
the two requirements were really paired s o that one requirement would catch anyone who for some reason slipped by the
other.

Although the dependency requirement is omitted for

widows, I think that it is most likely that Congress simply
assumed that the vast majority of widows were dependent on

7.

their deceased husbands and decided to omit the
of an individualized showing.

re~irement

In Wiesenfeld, the Court speaking

of the 1939 Act generally, concluded that its framers "legislated
on the'then generally accepted presumption that a man is
responsible for the support of his wife and children.'" 420
U.S. at 644 (citation omitted).

The following statement from

the SG's Jurisdictional Statement rings true to me:
Actual or presumed dependency is a central
feature of all dependents' benefits under the
Act where the purpose is to compensate for the loss
of the wage-earner's support. Thus, in addition
to the benefits afforded husbands, wives, widows,
and widowers of retirement age, dependency is also
an underlying requirement for parents' benefits
(42 U.S.C. 402(h), children's benefits (42 U.S.C.
402(d), and divorced wife's benefits (42 U.S.C. 402(b)).
J.S. at 9 n. 8.
Further evidence for this position can be derived from the
structure of the 1939 Act which extended secondary benefits
to widows for the first time.

Under the Act, the group ·entitled

to benefits without a showing of dependency was defined to
include all widows living in the same household as their
husband.

Widows who had been living apart from their husbands -

to whom the presumption of dependency is obviously weakened could recover, but only by showing that the deceased husband
had contributed to their support.

SG Brief at 21.

The require-

ment that a separated wife make such a showing was eliminated
in 1957.

Although the SG draws a different conclusion from

the elimination, it seems consistent to me with a congressional
determination that it was not worth the trouble and the expense.
Finally, the SG's analysis would require the conclusion that

8.
Congress had converted the social security system into a
partial general welfare system.
Administrative Convenience/Expense
It may be too late in the day to uphold a gender-based
discrimination on the basis of administrative convenience/expense.
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), one of the articulated
objectives of the rule pr eferring male administrators was the
elimination of an additional contested hearing.

The Court

recognized the legitimacy of that objective, but found that it
was not sufficient to justify the unequal treatment.

Similarly,

in Frontiero, the only justification advanced by the government
was administrative convenience.

The plurality noted that the

government had not demonstrated that it was cost efficient to
presume dependency of wives of male officers, but went on to
say that administrative convenience is simply not sufficient to
justify a suspect classification.

The concurrence written by

you was based on Reed, but without elaboration.

It would be

reasonable for a reader to conclude that administrative
convenience was also rejected as a justification in Frontiero.
Wiesenfeld is a case with two rationales.

The first

rationale extends the decision in Frontiero from the context
of a contract of employment to the context of social security
payments.

Finding that the gender-based differentiation at

issue there amounted to "the denigration of the efforts of
women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly

9.
to their families support, the Court held that Wiesenfeld was
controlled by Frontiero, 420 U.S. at 645.

The Court also

considered the government's argument that the differentiation
was intended to benefit women because of the difficulties that
they face in the labor market.

The Court found that the

asserted purpose was not the purpose at all.

This finding

led to what is, in fact, a second rationale:
Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent
to remain at ho~ to care for a child, the genderbased distinction of § 402(g) is entirely irrational.
420 U.S., at 651.

I

The second rationale was the sole ground of decision relied
upon by Justice Rehnquist.
You based your concurrence on an analysis quite similar
to the Court's first rationale:
A s urviving father may have the same need for
benefits as a surviving mother. The statutory
scheme therefore impermissibly discriminates
against a female wage earner because it provides
her family less protection than it provides that
of a male wage earner, even though the family needs
may be identical. I find no legitimate governmental interest that supports this gender
classification. 420 U.S., at 654-655.
The first rationale in Wiesenfeld, ~ce, does
appear to govern the instant case.
be made.

Distinctions can, ~er, /

Administrative convenience cannot be asserted as
-----~--------------that case as here because of the absolute nature of

statute.

Benefits were given to all widows with children
with children.

)

Indeed, the Court stated

that the situation in Wiesenfeld was, if anything, more
pernicious than in Frontiero because the male did not even

tfi.. C"'-"' ~~ .t 1... c:t.A ~· ~ .q_

~ ~~~ ,f,...,.M

;~

have a chance to provl his dependency, as he did in Frontiero,
and as he does here.

~ ~

w~·~~
(._z;;t.tt<• ~

I think that a more fundamental distinction based on the

~··~

apparent Congressional purpose in providing the survivorship
benefits can be drawn.

As stated above, I think that payments

to nondependent widows are tolerated, rather than intended, on
the theory that enough widows are in fact dependent that
separating out those who are not is not worth the expense.
Although the equal benefits for equal contributions argument can
be made here, it does not really make any sense.

The payment to

nondepende~t

widows is not made because of perceived need, but

because

more efficient to do that than to separate them

it~

by an individualized test.

The

e~nale

does not

apply for widowers because of the relatively small incidence
of dependency in that group.
The claim for equality here is a claim for equality in
the distribution of benefits that

c.A.....
~ inconsistent

underlying theory of the system.

The payments being sought here

with the

are secondary payments sought by one person on the basis of
another person's social security account.

The purpose of the

payments is to relieve the hardship of the loss of the support

~-~ o~ the person who has died.

~.~ upon

~~~-

~~

~e

insured person for one half of his support, Congress has
a decision that the hardship is not sufficient to justify

payment.

'~he

If the claimant was not dependent

There is an additional obstacle to one seeking payment.

claimant must not have a social security account in his or

'-~~~~-~~ ~hich is equal to or greater than the account of

V;J//v

11.

or she
the person under whose account

he 1\ claimS. If the account of

the claimant is as large, Congress has made a decision that
the claimant can simply rely on his primary benefits.

Payment

to a person who did not satisfy either of the above need-related
conditions would be inconsistent with congressional purpose.
Assuming that the dependency requirement were stricken,
two groups of males would benefit.

They would benefit in exactly

the same way as similarly situated females, but the point is that
to allow payments to either males ot females in those groups is
inconsistent with congressional purpose.

For persons covered

by social security in their own employment, elimination of the
dependency requirement would allow them to recover if they make
more than 25% of the family income and less than 50%.

Beyond

/)./

50%, the claimant would fall Afoul of the requirement that the
primary account not be equal to or more than the primary account
of the person upon whose account the claim is made.

If the

claimant does not work in a job covered by social security, as
is the case with appellee, the perversion of the congressional
purpose is complete, because not even the 50% of family income
would be a bar, because such persons do not have a primary
account with social security of any amount.
I do not think that the decided cases require this result.
In Frontiero the stated purpose of the benefit program was to
enhance the recruitment effort of the Air Force in enticing
people away from private industry.

The purpose of those benefits

was not to satisfy any perceived need on the part of the

12.
beneficiaries.

Congress chose, as it was certainly freeto do,

to condition the extra benefits on dependency, rather than the
mere fact of marriage.

It does seem apparent that there was no

necessary link between the showing of dependency and the achievement of the purpose - enhanced recruitment.

Extending the

benefits to Lt. Frontiero's spouse without a showing of
dependency was not inconsistent with the congressional purpose.
In Wiesenfeld there we re, I think, two purposes.

One found

by the Court was to allow a parent to stay home with a child.

{D ~~~~neutral.

Extending the benefits to widowers

with children actually advanced the purpose, and certainly
was not inconsistent with

it. ~he

second purpose was more

generally to provide support for the parent left with the
responsibility of supporting a child alone.

Although there

may have been a presumption of dependency underlying the
statutory gender differentiation, there was no specific showing
of dependency required.

Furthermore, to the extent that there

was a presumption of additional need on the part of women, the
statute had an "equalizing" element.

If the surviving spouse

elected to work (in which case males might have an advantage),
benefits were reduced by $ 1 for each $ 2 earned.

Therefore,

there was no real possibility for a male to make any use of his

provision

labor market advantage.

This Atended to eliminate payments

beyond the level of perceived need.
,~

In the instant case, there is a Jdirect link between
~

1-

the requirement that dependency be shown (or presumed)

.------

the reason for the program.

-----

~

As stated earlier, the underlying

13.
basis of the social security system is ultimately need. It
----------- seems that there was a decision that dependency is a fairly

-----

close predictor of need.

-

To the extent that dependency is

eliminated the system is cast free from its moorings.
Stereotyping
Appellee's arguments are littered with references to
stereotyping, self-fulfilling prophecies, denigrating the
contributions of women and the like.

I do think that some

kinds of streotyping in legislation are matters of genuine
concern.

I discussed the loose kinds of distinctions that I

would draw in Craig v. Boren and will not repeat them here.
I really do not feel that whatever stereotyping there might be
here is of the objectionable variety.
J

This law simply does not

"denigrate" the contributions of working women.

I do not see

that the statute, as I have interpreted its purpose, puts any
different value on the work of men or women.

It would be hard

to argue that the effect of this differentiation is going to
force or preclude any particular type of life-style.

Stanton

v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), is distinguishable on this ground.
To the extent that a woman takes the differentiation, as I have
interpreted it, as a comment on the value of her contribution
to her family by her work, she simply misunderstands.

If

a showing of significant administrative savings can be made,
the Coures upholding the statute would indicate no more than
that so many fewer women have dependent spouses that there

14.
is a significant savings of scarce resources by using the
assumption of dependency for widows.
Conclusion
I think that this case presents a real quandry.

I am

very reluctant to order a massive additional payment of benefits
that are inconsistent with the statutory purpose.

On the other

hand, there seems to be nothing more here than an assertion of
5
administrative convenience and expense. Reed and Fronterio
would preclude upholding a law on this basis alone, and I think
that sex discrimination is different enough that a more
convincing showing must be made.

Unless the savings were quite

significant (a matter of degree and judgment), I would not allow
an administrative savings justification.

From the statistics

presented here, it is impossible to guess as to whether such a
showing could be made.

The median contribution to family income

by wives who work is 27%, so a large numer of widows would not
be able to meet the tests applied to widowers.

There is nothing

in the papers concerning the expense of conducting the
\

individualized showing.
On this point appellee and the ACLU are rather inconsistent.
They argue that there is no proof that presuming widows to be
dependent saves money, pointing out that millions of women earn
enough money to cover at least one half of their own living
expenses, and thus to fall foul of the dependency requirements.
When addressing the question of the proper remedy in the event

15.
the Court accepts their argument, they argue against the
extension of the dependency test, urging instead that these
benefits be extended to all.

The reason given is that extension

of the dependency requirements would impose administrative burden
of "potentially monstrous proportion."

They argue that social

-

security is an earned benefit and not a need-related welfare,
ignoring the explicit requirements that Congress set up to try
to keep some degree of need-relation present.
If the Court were disposed to hold that demonstrated
savings of significant amounts can be enough of a justification
in a case of this type, it might consider remanding to the DC
for findings on this question.

If large scale savings cannot

be shown, I would, if possible, leave it to the Social Security
~~~..-!./'

Administration Ato chodS e whether to extend benefits to all
without a showing of dependency or to require individualized
showings by everyone.

T.B.
ss

1.'11-J.

FOOTNOTES
1.

This is one of five appeals docketed by appellant,

Secretary of HEW, involving substantially the same question:
whether the stringent support test restricting old-age survivors'
benefits to a spouse on a female insured individual's earnings
record, when no support test conditions benefits to a spous e on
a male insured individual's earnings record, discriminates
invidiously on the basis of gender in violation of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution.
docketed.

The instant appeal was the first

The remaining appeals, in order of docketing are:

Mathews v. Silbowitz, No. 75-712, opinion below, 397 F. Supp.
862 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Mathews v. Jablon, No. 75-739, opinion
below, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975); Mathews v. Coffin, No.
75-791, opinion below, 400 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1975); Mathews
v. Abbott, No. 75-1643, opinion below, ____ F. Supp. ____
. (N.D.
Ohio, February 12, 1976).

Each of the five district courts

held the gender-explicit support test unconstitutional.

Old-

age (husband's insurance) benefits are at issue in Silbowitz,
Jablon and Abbott; survivors' (widower's insurance) benefits
are at issue in the instant case; both old-age and survivors'
(husband's and widower's insurance) benefits are at issue in
Coffin.

The Secretary has indicated that if this Court affirms

the decision below, he may withdraw the remaining appeals.
2.

"Primary insurance amount" is the maximum monthly

benefit payable to a retired worker covered by social security
on the basis of his or her own earnings record.

Beneficiaries

other than the wage earner receive "secondary" or "derivative"
benefits.

N-2
3.

In Salfi this Court upheld a nine-month presumption

of ulterior motive as a method of screening out persons who,
in contemplation of death, marry in the hope of receiving or
bestowing social security benefits.

The admitted over-and-under-

inclusiveness of that presumption was not a fatal flaw.
4.

It is worth noting that this argument does not seem to

work in the case of wives seeking secondary benefits when their
Q~

husbands Aalive, but retired.

That is the situation in several

of the other cases with which this case was grouped.
1, supra.
5.

See also, Kahn v. Shevin, supra, at 355.

See note
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To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

TAB

-

Follow-up on Mat .hews v. Goldfarb

1.

The civil service employees' loophole.

The windfall gain that

the Gov't attorney referred to results from the fact that Goldfarb, as
a former civil service employee, was not covered by social security
at all.

In order to recover benefits, widowers must show both that

they were dependent on their deceased spouse and that their primary
insurance amounts (their social security entitlements which are related
to the level of their incomes) are less than those of the deceased
spouses.

In the case of a widower who was covered by social security

in his employment, the elimination of the dependency requirement would
benefit him only if his income had been less than that of his spouse,
because of the operation of the primary insurance amount requirement.
This result would allow more widowers to recover than if the dependency
requirement were enforced, but it would still bar recovery to those
widowers who made more than their spouses.

In the case of a widower

who was a civil service employee, the primary insurance amount requirement is no requirement at all;

such a widower has

~primary

insurance

_____ "' --

amount because he was never in the social security system at all.
(~~~")
Such a widower
would, in the absence of ~ dependency requirement, ._
be
...........
able to receive benefits although he earned more than his wife and
.
. 1 e d to a f at ' CLVL
. . 1 servLce
.
.
,,
LS
entLt
pensLon.

Such

a ~ result

is_ completely

.....

inconsistent with the need-dependency rationale of the system, but
L_

~

~...;

equally anomalous results would occur if the genders were reversed.
2.

Effect of Mathews v. Lucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5139 (1976).

This

is an important case that should be significant in the resolution of
the instant case.

Lucas involved social security survivorship benefits

for children of deceased persons who were insured under the system.
The case thus involved the same basic question as the instant case,
differing only in that a different class of beneficiaries was involved.
~
The--Ke'y to recovery for children was a showing of dep ,e ndency. The

"statute contains a number of presumptions of dependency keyed to
particular facts that are closely associated with dependency in fact.
The children in Lucas were illegitimates who did not fall under any

ThL C.o~r+ uphe., /( f-J-..e... /o..w.

of the presumptions, some of which did include illegitimates.
therefore had to prove actual dependency.

They

The case is significant first in that the Court decided the case
on the basis that dependency was the statutory requirement.

The

children had argued that the statute was designed to favor legitimates.
The case adds to my conviction that Congress excluded widows from
the dependency requirement

·

Cof~t€3S

because ~

(

elt that it was a reasonably

accurate assumption that they were dependent.

I still am unconvinced

by the Gov't's argument that Congress was trying to extend a helping
hand to widows.
The Court held that discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy
does not "command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."

44 U.S.L.W., at 5143.

In the process of so

holding, the Court noted that illegitimacy does not carry an obvious
badge, as race and sex do, and stated that "discrimination against

-

illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness
of the historic legal and political
Negroes."

discrimination against women and

Id.

Against that background the Court held that administrative
convenience could supply the justification for the statute.

The

following quotation is the Court's discussion of administrative
convenience as a justification:

Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of dependency was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to
~ume that every child of a deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency
on the basis of relatively readily documented !acts, such as
legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or paternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the
likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was
able to avoid the burden and expense of s ecific case-S case e rmmatJOn m t e arge num er of cases where
dependency is objectively probable. 1luch presumptiOns
i~aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible
under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence docs not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at 772.' 6
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations
must be supported at least by a showing that the Government's dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is
returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative expense
avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U .. S., at 689
(plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of the relation
between the statutory classifications and the likelihood
of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be "scientifically substantiated." James v. Strange, 407 U. S.
128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States, 354
U. S. 476, 501 (1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is required
in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the
burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts
devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 784. Finally, while the
'jl scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a
fl toothless one, e. g., Jimenez, supra; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S., at 691 (concurring opinions of MR. JusTICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE PowELL); Reed v. Reed,
404 U. S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to demonstrate the insubstantialit oi that relation. See mdsley v. Natural arbonic Gas o., 220·
U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63, 67 (1965).

44 U.S.L.W., at 5143.
The Court also discussed Frontiero and, since this discussion
in in the context of a social security case involving discrimination
justified on the basis of administrative convenience, it is obviously
important for the instant case.

,..--...

The Court contrasted the sta tute

before it in Lucas to that in Frontiero as follows:
It is, of course, not enough simply that any child
deceased insured is eligible for benefits upon some •
ing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 811
we found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement
dependent's benefits of a married woman in the u
formed services upon an individualized showing of
husband's actual dependence upon her for more t
half his income, when no such showing of actual dell<'ncS.
ency was required of a married man in the uniformed
services to obtain dependent's benefits on account of hit
wife. The invalidity of that gender-based discrimina,.
tion rested upon the "overbroad'' assumptiOn, Schlcsinga
v-:--Bazlard, 419 U.S. 49"8, 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination "that male workers' earnings are vttal to
the support of thei.I' famtlies, while the earnings of reo
male wage earners do not si mfican£ly contribute to
their famt tes supPQ . Weinberger v. Wiescnfcld, 420
U. g::" at 643; see Frontiero, 411 U. S., at GS9 n.
23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without
more but is carefully tuned to alternative considera.'
\
tions. The 'presumption of dependency is withht'ld o
in the absence of any significant mdtcabon of t'fic likrU.
hoOd of actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot . 1
that the factors that give rise to a presuniption of dfoo.
pendency lack any substantial relation to the likelih c
·- of actual dependency,

J

44 U.S.L.W., at 5144.
Given the above language in Lucas, I think that it would be impossible
in the instant case~tolsimply)assume an administrative convenience
rationale.

I think that Lucas might allow the Gov't to use a gender

based discrimination if it could show administrative savings.

Lucas

may be the explanation for the mid-stream shift in theories by the

I

Gov't.

Given that the Gov't did not build a trial record of adminis-

trative
savings and given that it did not rely on that theory before
....___.__
this Court, I am inclined to say that
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:§ttprtntt <!Jou.rt of tlrt 'Pnittb :§tatts
~aslrington. l!l. <!f. 20bl'J~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

October 18, 1976

Re: No. 75-699, Matthews v. Goldfarb
Dear Chief,
As presently advised, I vote to affirm the judgment
under the authority of our prior decisions. I am not particularly happy with this result, however, and shall read
with hospitable interest what is written on the other side~
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.inprtntt <!Jllltrl l.1f t4t ,-.mub' .§taftg
..Mfrhtghttt. ~. OJ. 20~~~
CHAMBERS Of"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

October 20, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE:

75-699 - Matthews v. Goldfarb

I have Potter's memo of October 18 still as a "tentative" vote to
affirm, changing from "reverse" - at least on my record. Lewis is
also "tentative affirm."
If both Potter and Lewis remain in the "affirm" column (I having now
voted to reverse), I, therefore, ask Bill Brennan to assign.

WEB

;;.

.

<!feud of tltt 'Jllnittb ~tlrlts
'llas4ittghm. ~. <!f. 20c?'l-;l

~u:pumc

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

October 21, 1976

RE: No. 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb
Dear Chief:
I have assigned the above case to myself.
Sincerely,

J
c/JL~[ (
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

flrt ~u~ ;§tattll'
~aglfhtghm. ~. <!J. 21lgt'-!~

.§u:pumt <!Jtturl ttf

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 21, 1976

Re:

75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb

Dear Bill:
As you know, I have already expressed doubt
about my original vote to affirm. Subject to
reading your opinion, I am now persuaded that I
will vote to reverse. My reason, in brief, is
that the discrimination is in the distribution
of benefits, rather than in the collection of
tne tax; :t-hat, the discrimination is therefore
against ales rather than females; and that,
a
oug
r · . facie invalid, its justification
is sufficient under Kahn v. Shevin.
I don't
believe this will cause you to lose ~our majority,
but want you to understand my present thinking
while your opinion is in process.
Respe~fully,

/{
Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

i)upulltt <!j:mtrlltf

tJrt ~b' i)taftlt

..agfrin:ghm. ~. <!J:. 2.0~,.~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

Re:

75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb

Dear Bill:
As you will note from the attached opinion, I
have finally decided to vote to affirm. As I am
sure you realize, I have had a great deal of difficulty with this case and I apologize to everyone
for taking so long in making up my mind.
Respectfully,

}vL
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

/

November 24, 1976 Conference
List 5, Sheet 2
No. 75-699

Motion of Appellee for Leave to
File Supplemental Brief, after
argument

MATHEWS

&~LDFARB
This is appellee's motion for leave to file a supplemental brief (7 pages) after
argument in which appellee discusses the opinion of CA 6 in Kalina_ v. Railroad
Retirement Board, decided September 13, 1976.

Appellee notes that Kalina, decided

after appellee 1 s brief on the merits was filed and reported in Law Week after oral
argument in this case, presents the identical constitutional issue raised in the instant
case.
There is no response.
11/19/76
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
I

No. 75-699

of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Appellant,

v.
Leon Goldfarb.

On Appe~tl from the United
States District Court for
the Eastern District of
New York.

[November -, 1976]
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Inllura.nce Beneffts program (OASDI) 42 U. S. C. §§ 401-431,
survivors' benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the Act are payable to his widow. Such
benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife
covered by the Act are payable to the widower, however,
only if he "was receiving at least one-half of his support"
from his deceaaed wife. 1 The question in this case is whether
MR. JusTIC& BRENN.\N"

1

'LH

t:l

F.rom : )lr J uRt'

F. David Mathews, Secretary

'rmun

42 U.S. C.§ iP'J (f) (1), in pertinent part, provides:

..The widower • • • of an individual who died a fully insured individual,

if such widower''(A) has not remarried,

"(B) (i) ~llil attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 ... and is
under a disability • . . ,
·
"(C) halil filed applicatiQn for widower's insurance benefits ... ,
"(D) (i) was receiving at least one-half of his t;upport . . . from such
individual at the time of bf'r death , or if such individual had a period
of disability whil!h did not end prior to the month in which she died, at
the time such p¢riod began or at the time of her dPath , and filed proof
of such support within two years after the date of such death ... , or
(ii) was receiving at least. one-half of his· sltpport . . . from such indi'idual at the time ihe became entitled to old-age . .. insurance bene-
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this gender.based distinction violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
A three-ju~ge District Court for the Eastern District of
New York held that the different treatment of men and
women mandated by § ~ (f)(1)(D) constituted invidious
discrimination against female wage earners by affording them
less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to
male employees, 396 F. Supp. 308 (1975).1! We noted prob.
able jurisdiction. 424 U. S. 906 (1976). We affirm.
fits . . . , and filed proof of such support within two years after the
month in which she became entitled to such benefits ... and,
"(E) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to
old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance
amount of his deceased wife,
"shall be entitled to a widower's insurance benefit . • . ."
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 402 (e) (1), which provides, in pertinent part:
"The widow . • . of an individual who dies a fully insured individual,
if such widow . . •
"(A) is not married,
"(B )(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has att~ined age 50 ... and is
under a disability . . • ,
"(C) (i) has filed application for widow's insurance benefits ..• and
"(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to
old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance
amount of such deceased individual,
''shall be entitled to a widow's insurance benefit ••.."
2 'fhe decision also applied to § 402 (c) ( 1) (C), which imposes a depend~
ency requirement on husbands of covered female wage earners applying
for old-age benefits; wives applying for such benefits are not required to
prove dependency,§ 402 (b). These gender-based classifications have been
uniformly held to be unconstitutional. See Abbott v. Weinberger, F. Supp. - , Civil No. C 74-194 (ND Ohio Feb. 12, 1976), appeal
docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Abbott, No. 75-1643 (husband's old•age
benefits); Coffin v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 400
F. Supp. 953 (DC 1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom.
Mathews v. Coffin, No. 75--791 (both husband's and widower's benefits);
Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 399 F. Supp.ll8 (Md.
1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Jablon,
No. 75-739 (husband's benefits); Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Edu,..
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I

Mrs. Hannah Goldfarb worked as a secretary in the New
York City public school system for almost 25 years until
her death in 1968. During that entire time she paid in full
all social security taxes required by the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101-3126. She was survived by her husband, Leon Goldfatb, now a.ge 72, a retired
federal employee. Leon duly applied for widower's benefits. The application was denied with the explanation that
"You do not qualify for a widower's benefit because
you do not meet ohe of the requirements for such entitlement. This requirement is that you must have
been receiving at least one-half support from your wife
when she died." 8
The District Court declared § 402 (f)(1)(D) unconstitucation and Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862 (SD Fla. 1975) (three-judge court) ,
appeal docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Silbowitz, No. 75-712 (husband's
F. 2d - ,
benefits). See also Kalina v. Railroad Retirement Board, No. 75-2256 (CA6 Sept. 13, 1976) (spouse's annuity under the Railroad
Retirement Act, 45 U.S. C. §231a(c)(3)(ii)).
8 Although Mr. Goldfarb did not pursue an administrative appeal of
the denial of his application, appellant concedes that because the denial
was based on his failure to meet a clear statutory requirement, further
administrative review would have been futile and the initial denia.I was
therefore "final" for purposes of the District Court's jurisdiction to
review it under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) . See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S.
749, 764-767 (1975).
In order for Mr. Goldfarb to have satisfied §402 (f)(1)(D), his wife
would have to have been earning three times what he earned. According
to Appellant's Brief, p. 25, "As a practical matter, only husbands whose
wives contribute 75 percent of the family income meet [the dependency]
test." That is because in order to meet the test, . the wife must have
provided for all of her own half of the family budget, plus half of her
husband's share.. For more elaborate descriptions of the dependency calculation, see 20 CFR § 404.350; Social Security Claims Manual, §§ 2625,
2628. See also Appellant's Brief, at 25-26, and n. 14; Appellee's Brief, at

6 n. 7.
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tional primarily on the authority of Weinbe11ger v. Wiesen-.
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), stating
" [ § 402 (f)( 1 )(D)] and its application to this plaintiff,
'deprive women of protection for their families which
men receive as a result of their employment.' Wein.
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 645 (1975). See
also Frontie'lfo v. Ric_ha.rdson, 411 V. S. 677 (l973).
"Whateyer may have been the ratio of contribution to
family expenses of the Goldfarbs while they both
worked, Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to the dignity of
knowing that her: social security ta~ would· contribute.
to their joint welfare when the couple or one of them
retired and her husband 's welfare should she predeceMe
him. She paid taxes at the s~tme rate as men and there
is not the slightest scintilla of support for the proposition tha.t workin~ women are less concerned about their
spouses' welfare in old age than are men." 397 F.
Supp. supra, at 308-309.
II

The gender-based distinction drawn by § 402 (f) (1) (D)burdening a widower but not a widow with the task of
'·proving dependency upon the dece~tsed spouse-presents ~tn
equal protection question indistinguishable from that decided \
in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, supra. Tha.t decision and the
decision in Frontiero v. Riclw,rdson, supra, plainly require
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court.
' '·
The statutes
held unconstitutional in Frontiero provided
increased quarters allowance a.nd medical at~d dental benefits to a married male member of the uniformed armed
services whether or not his wife in fact depended on him,
while a married female service member could only
receive the increased benefits if she in fact provided over
one-half of her husband's support. To justify the cla.ssific~t
tion, the Government argued that "as an empirical m~ttter,
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wives in our society frequently are dependent on their hus..
bands, while husbands are rarely dependent on their wives.
Thus, . . . Congress might reasonably have concluded that
it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to
presume that wives of male members are financially dependent on their husbands, while burdening female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact.n 411
U. S., at 688-689. But Frontiero concluded that, by according such differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of
achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statute
violated the Fifth Amendment. See Reed v. Reed, 4:04 U. S.
71, 76 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 64:5, 650--657
(1972); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 506-507
(1975).
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, like the instant case, presented
the question in the context of the OASDI progr&m. There
the Court held" unconstitutional a provision that denied
father's insurance benefits to surviving widowers with children in their care, while authorizing similar mother's benefits to similarly situated widows. Paula Wiesenfeld, the
principal source of her family's support, t:~-nd covered by the
Act, died in childbirth, survived by the baby and her husband Stephen. Stephen applied for survivors' benefits for
himself and his infant son. Benefits were allowed the baby
under 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d), but denied the father on the
ground that "mother's benefits" under § 402 (g) were available only to women. The Court reversed, holding that the
gender-based distinction made by § 402 (g) was "indistin. guishable from that invalidated in Frontiero," 420 U. S., at
642, and therefore) while_.- - - - - - - - " .. . the notion that men are more likely than women
to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support, ... such
a gender-based generalization ct:~-nnot suffice to justify

1
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the denigration of the efforts of women who do worlc
and whose earnings contribute significantly to their
families' support.
"Section 402 (g) clearly operates, as did the statutes
invalidated by our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive
women of protection for their families which men re..
ceive as a result of their employment. Indeed, the
classification here is in some ways more pernicious . • •
[I]n this case soci~ security taxes were deducted from
Paula's salary during the years in which she worked.
Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family
the same protection which a similarly situated male
worker would have received, but she also was deprived
of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute
to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to
others." ld., at 645.
Precisely the same reasoning condemns the gender-based
distinction made by § 402 (f) ( 1)(D) in this case. For th~t
distinction too operates Hto deprive women of protection for
their families which men receive fi,S a result of their employment": social security taxes were deducted from Hannah
Goldfarb's salary during the quarter-century she worked as
a secretary, yet, in consequence of§ 402 (f)(l)(D), she also
"not only failed to receive for her [spouse] the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have
received [for his spouse] but she also was deprived of a
portion of her earnings in order to contribute to the fund
out of which benefits would be paid to others." Wiesenfeld
thus inescapably compels the conclusion reached by the District Court that the gender-based differentiation created by
§ 402 (f)( I) (D)-that results in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of
men-is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by ,no more substantial justification than "archaic

I
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overbroad" generalizations, Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra,
419 U. S., at 508, or "old notions," Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U. S. 7, 14 (1975), such as "assumptions as to dependency,"
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645, that are more consistent with "the role-typing society has long imposed,"
Stanton v. Stanton, supra, at 15, than with contemporary
reality. Thus § 402 (f) (1) (D) "[b]y providing dissimilar
treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated ... violates the [Fifth Amendment]. Reed v. Reed,
404 u. s. 71, 77.
" Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra,
at 653.

III
Appellant, however, would focus equal protection analysis
not upon the discrimination against the covered wage earning
female, but rather upon whether her surviving widower was
unconstitutionally discriminated against by burdening him
but not a surviving widow with proof of dependency. The
gist of the argument is that, analyzed from the perspective of
the widower, " ... the dehial of behentS reflected the congressional judgment that aged widowers as a class were sufficiently likely not to be dependent upon their wives, that it
was appropriate to deny them benefits unleSs they were in
fact dependent." Appellant's Brief, p. 12.
But Weinberger v. Wiesen/eld rejected the virtually identical argument when appellant's predecessor argued that the
statutory classification there attacked should be regarded
from the perspective of the prospective beneficiary and not
from that of the covered wa.ge earner. The Secretary's
Brief in that case, p. 14, argued that " ... the pattern of
legislation reflects the considered judgment of Congress that
the 'probable need' for financial assistance is greater in the
case of a widow, with young children to maintain, than in
the case of similarly situated males." The Court, however,
analyzed the classification from the perspective of the wage
earner and concluded tha.t the clMiification was uncQhiti-
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tutional because "benefits must be distributed according to
classifications which do not without sufficient justification
differentiate among covered employees solely on the basis
of sex." 420 U. S., at 647. Thus, contrary to appellant's
insistence, Appella.nt's Brief, p. 12, Wiegenfeld is "dispositive
here."
From its inception, the social security system has be~n
~program of social insurance. Covered employees and their
employers pay taxes into a fuhd administered distinct froln
the general federal revenues to purchase protectioi1 against
the economic consequences of old age, disability and death.
But under § 402 (f)(l)(D) female insureds received less pro•
tection for their spouses solely because of their sex.. Mrs.
Goldfarb worked and paid social security taxes for 25 years
at the same rate as her male collea.gues, but because of § 402
(f)(l)(D) the insurance protection received by the males was
broa.Qer than hers. Pl~inly then § 402 (f) (l)(D) di~van
tages women contributors to the social security system as compared to similarly situated men. 4 The section then "impel':
missibly discriminates against a female wage earner because it
provides her family less protection thah it provides that of a
male wa.ge earner, even though the fa.tllily needs may be identical." 4~0 U. S., at 654-655 (PowELL, J., concurring).
In a sense of course both the female wage earner and her
sur.viving spouse are disadvantaged by operation of the
statute, but this is because "Social Security is designed .. ,
The qisadvanta~e to the woman wage earner is even more pronoun ceq
in the case of t!ld-age benefits, to which a similarly \lnequal dependency
requirement applies. 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (b), (c) (1) (C). See n. 2, supra.
~n that situation, where the insured herself Is still living, she is deniecl
not only "the dignity of knowing [during her working career] that her
social security tax would contribute to their joint welfare when the couple
or one of them retired and her husband's welfare should she predecease
hirq," Goldfarb v. Secretary of Realth, F.{ducation and Welfare, 396 F,
Supp, 308, 309 (EDNY 1975), but abo the more tangible benefit. of an
incteasr, ~n th~ income of tllc famio/ ~nit l()f which she remains a .parh
4•
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for the protection of the family," 420 U. S., a,t 654. (JusTICE
PowELL concurring), • and the section discriminates against
one particular category of f~ily-that in which the female
spouse is a wage earner covered by social security.(1 Therefore decision of the equal protection challenge in this case
cannot focus solely on the distinction drawn between widowers and widows but, as Wiesenfeld held, upon the gender-based
discrimination against covered female wage earners as well. 7

IV
Appellant's emphasis upon the sex based distinction between widow and widower as recipients of benefits rather
5 See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1939),
accompanying the bill that extended social security benefits for the first
time beyond the covered wage earner himself. The Report emphasizes
that the purpose of the amendments was "to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit." (Emphasis supplied.)
6 This is accepted by appellant. and appellees.
See, e. g., Appellant's
Brief, at 13 n. 2; Appellee's Brief, at 23; Tr. of Oral Arg., at 7.
1 In any event, gender-based discriminations against men have been
invalidated when they do ~ot "serve important governmental objectives
and [are not] substnntially rE'lated to the achievement of those objectives."
C~ IJ9ren,- U.S.-,· (1976). Neither Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U. 8. 351 (1974), nor Schlesinge1· v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), relied
on by appellnnt, supports a contrary conclusion. The gender-based distinctions in the stntutes involved in Kahn and Ballard were justified because
the only discernible purpose of each wns the permissible one of redressing
our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women. Craig v. Boren,
supra, a t - n. 6 (1976).
But "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an
automatic shield that protects ngainst nny inquiry into the actual purposes
underlying a legislative scheme."" Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S.
636, 648 (1975). That inquiry in this case demonstrates thnt § 402 (f)
(1) (D) has no such remedial purpose. Se<> Part IV-B, infra. Moreover, the classifications rhallenged in Wiesenfeld and in this case rather
than advantage women to compensate for past wrongs compounds those
wrongs by penalizil1g women "who do work and whose earnings contribute
significantly to their families' support." Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U. S.,
at 645.
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than that between covered female and covered male em~
ployees also emerges in his other arguments. These argu~
ments have no merit.
A
We accept as settled the proposition argued by appellant
that Congress has wide latitude to create classifications that
allocate noncontractual benefits under a social welfare pro~
gram. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 77&-777 (1975);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 609- 610 (1960). It is
generally the case, as said in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S.,
at 611, that
"Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a
noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program
such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the
Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar
only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classi~
fication, utterly lacking in rational justification."
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, 422 U. S., at 768-770;
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 , 84 (1971); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485-486 (1970).
But this "does not, of course, immunize [social welfare
legislation] from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment."
Richardson v. Belcher, supra, 404 U. S., at 81. The Social
Security Act is permeated with provisions that draw lines
in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decistons in this regard are entitled to deference as
those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for making such
judgments in light of competing policies and interests, But
"[t]o withstand constitutional ch~llenge, . .. classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." Craig v. Boren,- U. S . - , - (1976). 8 Such
s Thus,

justHic~tions

that suffice for non-gender-based

classifi c~ttions

in

1
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classifications, however, ha.ve frequently been revealed on
analysis to rest only upon "old notions" and "archaic and
overboard" generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton, supra, 421
U. S., at 14; Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, 419 U. S., at 508;
cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 44 U. S. L. W. 5139, 5144 (1976),
and so have been found to offend the prohibitions &gainst
denial of equal protection of the law., Reed v. Reed, supra;
Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
supra; Stanton v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See
also Stanley v. Illinois, supra; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S.
522 (1975).
Therefore, Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 640-647, expressly rejected the argument of appellant's predecessor, relying on
Flemming v. Nestor, that the "non-contractual" interest of
a covered employee in future social security benefits precluded any claim of denial of equal protection. Rather,
Wiesenfeld held that the fact that the interest is "noncontractual" does not mean that "a covered employee has
no right whatever to be treated equally with other employees
as regards the benefits which flow from his or her employment," nor does it "sanction differential protection for
covered employees which is solely gender-based." 420 U. S.,
the social welfare area. do not necessarily justify gender discriminations.
For example, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), sustained a discrimination d~igned to weed out collusive marriages without making
case-by-case determinntions bE>hveen marriages of less than nine months'
duration and longer ones on thE> ground that
"While such a limitation donbtles;; proves in particular cases to be 'underinclusive' or 'over-inclusive' in light of its presumed purpose, it is nonetheless a widely accepted response to legitimate interests in admini~trative
economy and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms." /d.,
at 776.
Yet administrntive conveniencE> and certainty of result have been found
inadequate justifications for grndE>r-basf'cl ela;;~ifications. Reed v. Reed,
404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971); Fmntiero v. Ri(·hardson, 411 U. 8. 677, 690
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, ,.05 U.S. 645, 656-657 (1972). Cf. Mathew8
v. Lucas, 44 U.S. L. W. 5139, 5143 (1976).

l
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646. On the contrary, benefits "directly related to years
worked and amount earned by a covered employee, and not
to the needs of the beneficiaries directly," like the
employment-related benefits in Frontiero, "must be distributed according to classifications which do not without sufli.
cient justification differentiate among covered employee1
solely on the basis of sex." 420 U. S., at 647.

B

l

Appellant next argues that Frontiero and Wiesenfeld
lhould be distinguished as involving statutes with different
Rather than merely
objectives than § 402 (f) (1) (D).
enacting presumptions designed to save the expense and
trouble of determining which spouses are really dependent,
providing benefits to all widows, but only to such widowers
as prove dependency, § 402 (f) ( 1) (D), it is argued, ration.
ally defines different standards of eligibility because of the
differing social welfare needs of widowers and widows. That
is, the argument runs, Congress may reasonably have pre ..
sumed that nondependent widows, who receive benefits. are
needier than nondependent widowers, who do not, because
of job discrimination against women (particularly older
women), 'see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 3!H, 353-354 (1974),
and because they are more likely to have been more dependent on their spouses. See Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U. S., at
645; Kahn v. Shevin, supra, 416 U. S., at 354 n. 7.u
But "inquiry into the actual purposes" of the discrimina~ (
tion, Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U. S., at 648, proves the contrary.
First, § 405 (f)(l) (D itself is phrased in terms of depend ..

0 This a.rgument is made for the first time in Appellant's Brief.
The
Jurisdictional Statement argued only thr rationality of "extending tG
wom~ . , • the presumption of dependenry.'' J. St., nt 11.
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wives for more than one-half of their support. On the face
of the statute, dependency, not need, is the criterion for
inclusion.
Moreover, the general scheme of OASDI shows that dependence on the covered wage earner is the critical factor
in determining beneficiary categories. 10 OASDI is intended
to insure covered wage earners and their families against the
economic and social impact on the family normally entailed
by loss of the wage earner's income due to retirement, disability, or death, by providing benefits to replace the lost
wages. Cf. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 633-634
(1974). Thus. benefits are not paid, as under other welfare
programs, simply to categories of the population at large
who need economic assistance, but only to members of the
family of the insured wage earner." Moreover, every family
member other than a wife or widow is eligible for benefits
only if a dependent of the covE-red wage earner. 12 This accords with the system's general purpose; one who was not
dependent to some degree on the covered wage earner suffers
10 Although presumed need ha:s b('('n a fuetor in determining tiH' nmouut:s
of social security benefits, in addition 1o the extent of contribution!; made
to the system, the primary determinant;; of the benefits received are the
years worked and amount earned by tlw coverf'd worker. 42 U. S. C.
§§ 414, 415. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647, and nn. 14,
15 (1975). In any event, need i!S not a requirement. for inC'Iusion in any
beneficiary category, 42 U. S. C. § 402 , and from the beginning was
intended to be irrelevant to the right to receive benefit!S. Sec H . H. Rep.
No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at. 1 (19a5).
11 Old-nge and survivor!S' bmefits may be paid to the in:sured wage
ea.rner himself, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (2): hilS :spou:se, while he is :still alive,
§402(b), (c), or after his death, §402 (e) , (f), (g); his children, §40'2
(d); and his parent!S, § 402 (h).
1: Dependenc~· is a piwrqui:,;ih• to qualification for parents' benefits,
§402 (h)(l)(B), children'~' benefits. §402 (d)(l)(C), husbands' benefits,
§402 (c)(l)(C), and widower;;' benefits, §40'2 (f)(l)(D) . (Certain children are "deemed" dependent, § 402 (d) (3). This pre:sumption wail
upheld as sufficif'ntly accurate to pass scrutiny on grounds of ''administra•
tive convenience," Mathew8 v. Lucas, 44 0. S. L, W. 5139 (1976) .)
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no economic loss when the wage earner leaves the work
force. Thus the overall statutory scheme makes actual dependency the generf\,1 basis qf eligibility for OASDI benefits, and
the statute, in omitting that requirement for wives and
widows, reflects only a presumption that they are ordinarily
dependent. At all events, nothing whatever suggests a reasoned congressional judgment that nondependent widows
should receive benefits because they are more likely to be
needy than nondependent widowers.
Finally, the legislative history of § 402 (f) (1) (D) refutes
appellant's contention. The old age provisions of the ori~naJ
Social Security Act, 49 Stf\,t. 622 (1935), provided pension
benefits only to the wage earner himself, with a lump-sum
p~yment to his estate under certain circumstances.la Wives'
and widows' benefits were first provided when coverage was
extended to other family members in 1939. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1360, 1364-1366. The
general purpose of the amendments was "to ~ord more
adequate protection for the family as a unit." H. R. Rep.
No, 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1939). • (Emphasis supplied.) The House Ways and Mea.ns Committee criticized
the old lump·sum pay1nent because it "make[s] payments
to the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether or
not he leaves dependents." Ibid. The Socia.l Security
Board, which had initiated the amendments in a report trans.,
mitted by the President tQ Congress, recommended the adoption of survivors' benefits because "The payment of mouthly
benefits to widows and orphans, who are the two chief
classes of dependent survivors, would furnish more significant
protection than does the payment of lump-sum benefits."
H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939). 14 In
1 a This paym~nt ~s:sentially nmounted to :3Y % of th~ wnge l.'arncr's
2
earnings while covered. less t.he amount rec~iveq as an old-age pension,
Social Security Act §203, 49 Stat. 623 (1935).
14 See also remark:; of Semltor l-{Rrricon, 84 Cong. Rec. 8827 ( 1939),
To tlt!! extent thflt this statement- indir&tes thnt Qpngres.~ founc{ wi<lP\\\~
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~tddition

to recommending survivors' benefits, the Board sug.
gested the extension of old-age pension benefits "for the
aged dependent wife of the retired worker.l,/i /d., at 6. On
the Senate floor, Senator Harrison, the principal proponent
of the amendments. criticized the then existing system of
benefits because under it "no regard is had as to whether
[the covered wage earner] has a dependent wife, or whether
he dies leaving a child, widow, or parents." 84 Cong. Rec.
8827 (1939). There is no indication whatever in any of the
legislative history that Congress gave any attention to the
specific case of nondependent widows. and found that they
were in need of benefits despite their lack of dependency,
in order to compensate them for disadvantages caused by
sex discrimination.
There is every indication that, as
Wicsenfeld, supra, recognized. 420 U. S., at 644. "the framers
of the Act legislated on the 'then generally accepted pre·
sumption that a man is responsible for the support of his
wife and children,' D. Hoskins & L. Bi"by, Women and
Social Security: Law and Policy in Five Countries, Social
Security Administration Research Report No. 42, p. 77
(1973)." lU
Survivors' and old age benefits were not extended to husbands and widowers until 1950. 64 St~t. 483-485. The
legislative history of this provision also demonstr~tes that
Congress did not create the disparity between nondependent
widows and widowers with a compensatory purpose. The
and orphans needier than other dependents, it may support a discrimination between dependent widows and dependPnt widowers, but it certainly
dt>monstra IPs a congressional a~s11mpt\on that widows are dependent,
rat.hf'r than an intention to ald nondPpcndent widows because of a finding
that. thPy arP neediE-r than nondependent. widowers.
1
" &e also Final Heport of t.lw Advisory Council on Social Security, at
24 ( 1938): "The inadequacy of th~ benefits payable during the early
years of the old-age insurance program is more marked where the benefits
must support not only the annuitant himself, but also his wife."
Ju S<•e also the further excerpts from and discussion of the legislative
l•i~tQry in U'iesenfelrl, 420 U. S., at 644 n. 13.
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impetus for change came from the Advisory Council on
Social Security, which recommended benefits for "the aged,
dependent husband ... [and] widower." The purpose of
this recommendation was "[t]o equalize the protection given
to the dependents of women and men" because "[u]nder
the present program, insured women lack some of the rights
which insured men ca.n acquire." Advisory Council on Social Security, Recommendations for Social Security Legislation, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., at 38 (1949).
(Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the Report that the
Advisory Council assumed that the provision of benefits to dependent husbands and widowers was the equivalent
of the provision of benefits to wives and widows under the
previous statute, and not a lesser protection deliberately
made because of lesser need. Although the original House
Bill H. R. 6000 that became the Social Security
Act Amendments of 1950 did not contain a provision for
husbands' and widowers' benefits, the Senate Finance
Committee added it, because "the committee believes that
protection given to dependents of women and men should
be made more comparable." S. Rep. No. 1669, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess., at 28 (1950). In 1950, as in 1939, there was simply
no indication of an intention to create a differential treatment
for the benefit of nondependent wives.
We conclude, therefore, that the differential treatment of
nondependent widows and widowers results not, as appellant
asserts, from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy
the arguably greater needs of the former. but rather from
an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage
earners. coupled with a presumption that wives are usually
dependent. This presents precisely the situation faced in
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld. The only conceivable justification for writing the presumption of wives' dependency into
the statute is the assumption, not verified by the Government in Frontiero , 411 U. S., at 689, or here, but based simply on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, Schlesinger v.

.)
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Ballard, supra, 419 U. S., at 508, that it would save the
Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits
to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency
of both sexes. 17 We held in Frontiero, and again in Wiesenfeld, and therefore hold again here, that such assumptions do
not suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the
distribution of employment-related benefits.18
Affirmed.
17

In fact, the legislative history suggP8ts t hat Congress proceeded casually on a "then generally accepted" l'ltrrrotype and did not focus on the
possible expense of determining dependC"nce in every case.
18
Even if appellant's theory of the purpose of the discrimination
were accurate, it would not necessarih lollow that the classification
is "fairly and substantially related" to that purpose. Reed v. Reed, 404
U. S. 71 , 76 (1971) . If Congress inh•nded to provide greater benefit s to widows because they were perc<•ived as generally needier than
widowers, it cho~e a strikingly imprecise instn.1ment.. On the one hand,
all widows of wage earners covered by social security are presumed
needy, regardless of whether they are actually needy or of whether they
were dependent on their deceased husbands. Though widows as a class
may well constitute a disadvantaged group, t he precise sub-class of
widows benefited by the discrimination at is~>ht> here are those least likely
to be needy: those whose husbands were covered wage earners and who
themselves earned enough not to be dependent on their husbands' earnings. Widows dependent on husbands who had no social security protection, likely to be the neediest of the needy class, are not reached at all
by the benefits provided here, and dependent widows of covered wage
earners receive no greater benefit than widowers in the same situation.
The discriminatory scheme i:s not carefully tailored to meet the needs of
even those nondependent widpws who benefit from it, because any subsidy
given through the OASDI system is not related to need, but to the years
worked and amount earned by the covered wage earner.
On the other hand, widowers of covered individuals are presumed less
needy unless their wives out~earned them by 3 to 1. Just as many working wives would fail this test if it were applied to them, so there are many
widowers whose accustomed standard of living depended in considerable
measure on their wives' earnings, even if they could not demonstrate
dependency under this formula.. Tile actual poverty of the widower is
not taken into account, only wllether he can pass the stringent dependency

test.
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December 2, 1976

Re:

No. 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb

Dear Bill:
In due course, I will circulate a dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,
/ 1
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Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to Conference
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December 13, 1976

Re:

No. 75-699
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Mathews v. Goldfarb

Dear Bill:
I am, of course, awaiting the dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

~1qrrm.:

Clfeltttof tlrt~b .§futtg
'PJCU¥l("innf.ctl4 ~. ~ 20P:>!-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 14, 1976

75-699- Mathews v. Goldfarb
Dear Bill,
As I have indicated to you orally, I
think your proposed opinion for the Court is
a remarkably fine job, and that, given
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the result it
reaches is close to unanswerable. As I have '
also orally indicated, however, I have had
some second thoughts about the Wiesenfeld
decision, and for that reason shall await the
dissenting opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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January 3, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb

Upon reading Bill Rehnquist's dissent, I propose to
make no changes beyond insertion of the following footnote
at the end of the first paragraph of Part II on page 4:
The dissent maintains that this sentence 11 0verstates [the] relevance 11 of Wiesenfeld and Frontiero.
It is sufficient to answer that the principal propositions argued by appellant and in the dissent, -namely, the focus on discrimination between surviving,
rather than insured, spouses; the reliance on Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the argument that the
presumption of female dependence is empirically supportable, and the emphasis on the special deference
due to classifications in the Social Security Act -were all asserted and rejected in one or both of those
cases as justifications for statutes substantially
similar in effect to Sec. 402(f)(l)(D).
W.J.B. Jr.
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Dear Bill:
Although I expect to join your dissent, I
want to try my hand at a few additiona~ paragraphs
to point up the difference between this case and
cases like Mathews v. Lucas and Craig v. Boren.
Respectfully,

JL

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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January 4, 1977

No. 75-699, Mathews v. Goldfarb
Dear Bill,
Mter considerable backing and filling,
I have concluded that yours is the preferable
conclusion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference
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January 4, 1977

Re:
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Mathews v. Goldfarb

Dear Bill:
I join your dissent.

It should convince even

the most ardent "equal protector"!
Regards,
WEB

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

Lewis,
How can you not agree with WHR!?
WEB
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January 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE: No. 75-699

Mathews v. Goldfarb

My circulation in this case explains why this case is controlled by Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, and this memo is circulated
simply to suggest why Bill Rehnquist's dissent does not, in my
view, succeed in distinguishing those cases.
Bill's first major thread is that the Social Security Act is
somehow sui generis and therefore invulnerable to equal protection
attacks. This is precisely the argument, however, that was used to
attempt to distinguish Wiesenfeld from Frontiero, and we squarely
rejected it. 420 U.S., at 646-647. Indeed, Wiesenfeld held that
the fact that the case arose in the context of the contributory
social security system made the discrimination there "more pernicious"
than that in Frontiero. 420 U.S., at 645. Bill argues, however,
that Mathews v. Lucas, 44 USLW 5139 (1976), and '~einberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975), embraced the argument rejected in Wiesenfeld
and established a new principle that constitutional doctrines developed in other fields of law do not have the same force in the
context of the Social Security Act, and that this new principle
undercuts Wiesenfeld.
But nothing in Salfi or Lucas purports to establish any new
principle, or to cast any doubt on Wiesenfeld. Salfi was decided
only three months after Wiesenfeld. It relies on such cases as
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
See 422 U.S., at 768-770. All of these cases pre-dated Wiesenfeld,
and Wiesenfeld and my opinion in Goldfarb, like Salfi, recognize
the principle they establish, namely that congressional judgments
in the field of social welfare are to be accorded considerable
deference. Salfi did not involve sex discrimination, or indeed
any equal protection issue at all, dealing instead with the quite
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different doctrine of conclusive presumptions. The concern it expresses that overuse of that doctrine could invalidate the myriad
examples of line-drawing in the Social Security Act, such as the
requirement that claims be filed within 60 days rather than, say,
75, given as the reason for limiting the doctrine in the social
security context, 422 U.S., at 772-773, hardly seems applicable to
the limited use of the equal protection clause to prevent gender
discrimination. Cases this Term such as Mathews v. deCastro and
Knebel v. Rein demonstrate that restraint against erasure of lines
drawn on bases other than gender presents no problem. Thus, Salfi
simply does not represent any new departure inconsistent with
Wiesenfeld.
Nor does Lucas teach that a distinction impermissible in another
area · is permissible in the context of the Social Security Act. Lucas
relies both on cases arising under the Social Security Act, e.g.,
Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), and on cases in other
areas,~., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), in support of the standard
applied to the classification at issue in that case. 44 USLW at 51415142. And of particular significance, Lucas most carefully distinguished Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, noting that "discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.••
Id., at 5142. In Frontiero and Wiesenfeld,
The invalidity of [the] gender-based discrimination rested
upon the "overbroad" assumption, Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination
"that male workers' earnings are vital to the support of
their families, while the earnings of female wage earners
do not significantly contribute to their families' support."
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero,
411 U.S., at 689 n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does
not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates
without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations.
44 USLW at 5144. This same overbroad presumption, which we condemned
in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, is at the heart of "the severe [and] pervasive • • • historic legal and political discrimination against women, 11
and is the basis of the statute under review. Nothing in Salfi or
Lucas remotely suggests that legislation based on this damaging presumption about women is any more permissible in the Social Security
Act than in other legislation, or more permissible now than it was
less than two years ago.
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Bill's second thread is his reliance on Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974). This argument was also made in Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at
648, and rejected there. It was rejected precisely because the Court
decided that a classification cannot be regarded as remedial, and
thus exempt from heightened scrutiny, when it penalizes working women
by giving them less insurance protection for their families on the
basis of an invidious and overbroad presumption that has historically
been used to discriminate against them. Bill challenges Wiesenfeld's
deliberately chosen focus of the equal protection analysis from the
viewpoint of the wage-earning wife; he says that focus was "questionable", dissent at 15. However questionable, it was the basis of both
Court and concurring opinions in Wiesenfeld, which seven of us joined.
Moreover, it cannot be questioned that a discrimination against the
survivors of a deceased insured on the basis of the sex of the insured
is at least in some part a discrimination against the insured. Social
security benefits, after all, unlike the subsidy in Kahn, are available
only to those who stand in a defined relationship to the insured; they
are not awarded to recipients solely on the basis of their own characteristics. The benefits are earned by the insured, and in a real
sense accrue to him or her as much as to the nominal recipient. (The
benefit accrues to the insured in a more tangible sense in the case of
. the living retired insured covered by the spouses' insurance provisions
at issue in the companion cases.) A discrimination that affects 'vorking women in this way, as Wiesenfeld squarely held, cannot be regarded
as remedial.
In short, I can find nothing in Bill's dissent that provides any
principled basis for distinguishing Wiesenfeld and Frontiero, or indeed raises any arguments that were not raised in Wiesenfeld and rejected. I simply cannot accept Bill's proposal that a decision joined
by all but one Justice only two Terms ago should now be so thoroughly
repudiated. This "ardent 'equal protector"', at least remains unpersuaded.

W.J.B. Jr.
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Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dis sent.
Sincerely,
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